• Q : The dividend pool is complex through points/PK and can be easily manipulated by malicious teams/studios?
• A : The original plan was complicated, and has been switched to Last One Win (a simple timer to win the prize pool); points/PK limited to 90s Ultimate mode + bonus 25% (small share, high manipulation cost/low return); added on-chain verification and random operation delay to prevent fraud.


• Q : Is the risk of entering the user market too high (few boxes left, fierce competition)?
• A : High last win rewards (1U bet multiple times) + high initial points/PK comeback bonus; exit safety net 0.5-0.9U low loss; dynamic timer to extend the hot room.


• Q : Does the treasure chest increase (infinite dilution value)?
• A : No increase in the total number of crates, fixed at 100 (pump.fun's fixed supply pump price ensures dynamic value growth without dilution); multiple rounds of release (20 crates per round, accelerated based on player count) to avoid indefinite game extension. Reasoning: Adding crates will reduce the value of each crate (more crates are spread across the total pool), which violates the FOMO (Fear of Motivation) and reduces user motivation to join. If the game is too short, dynamic timers or end conditions can be used to extend the game, rather than increasing the number of crates. Potential drawback: Fixed crates may lead to intense competition in hot rooms, but this is balanced by PK and point bonuses.


• Q : If a user exits early, should they return to the game after eating the treasure chest (diluting the value vs. extending the game)?
• A : No return (cash taken offers instant withdrawals, not return to the game, to avoid diluting the value of remaining crates); extended by a dynamic timer and hard cap (200 players cumulatively), with the value of remaining crates credited to the prize pool upon graduation. Details: Returning crates increases effective supply (more remaining crates), resulting in a decrease in the value of each crate (e.g., if 10 crates are returned, the total is 110, with the value dropping from 1U to 0.91U). This is similar to pump.fun's selling dilution curve, mitigating user FOMO. The advantage is a longer ending (slower consumption, more new pumps), but the disadvantages are significant: easy manipulation (cash back, return, and repeat) and complex settlement (tracking held crates and deducting penalties). Choosing a no return strategy allows you to lock in low-price profits early on by taking crates, and then bet on high-price remaining crates/astwins later. If the test game is short, you can add a 20% withdrawal penalty to the prize pool (increasing value to encourage retention).


• Q : What is the motivation for early adopters (second/third place) (no last-win opportunity)?
• A : Instant guarantee for eating boxes + point bonus sharing + gambling pump (the more people follow, the higher the box value/prize pool); low loss when exiting; low gradient value in the first round to encourage staying.


• Q : The room ends early (e.g., the timer reaches 0 after 20 players), resulting in a small prize pool/poor experience?
• A : Dynamic timer (+30s/join) extended; remaining boxes injected into the prize pool (small room prize pool larger, e.g., 20 people 19U+); system matching initial minimum 1U; new room restart cycle; upper limit 1 hour to prevent excessive time.


• Q : The platform occupies 2U/room, how to make money?
• A : Gas is 10% tiered (5% reward pool, 5% platform fee); fee income covers subsidies (hot room fees > small room subsidies); global fee pool snowballs; commercial upgrades such as naming rights auction 1U.


• Q : Is the bonus ratio attractive enough (the original 10% was weak)?
• A : Increased to 25% (75% of the main prize pool), enhancing competitive motivation (points are valuable), but the previous victory still maintains the main incentive; simulation shows balance (previous victory multiplier >14x).